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THE APPLICATION OF THE WORLD
BANK STANDARDS TO THE OIL
INDUSTRY: CAN THE WORLD BANK
GROUP PROMOTE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY?
Genoveva Hernández Uriz∗
I. INTRODUCTION

H

rights activists have turned their attention to
international financial institutions (“IFIs”), because they
have acquired more leverage in the international architecture than the traditional United Nations (“UN”)-based
mechanisms.1 The World Bank Group (“World Bank” or
“Bank”) has become the world’s main developmental institution.
The International Development Association (“IDA”), the softloan window of the World Bank, has attracted more resources
on its own than the entire UN system.2 The World Bank resources quadruple those of the UN when one adds the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”).3
The World Bank, through its private sector arms — the International Financial Corporation (“IFC”) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) — lends and provides
insurance, respectively, to companies willing to invest in developing countries.4 Given its vocation as an investment promoter,
UMAN
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1. HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, H UMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001,
xviii–xix (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/intro/index.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2002).
2. HELGE OLE BERGESEN & LEIV LUNDE , DINOSAURS OR D YNAMOS ?: T HE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 161–62,
198, 213 (1999).
3. Id. at 161.
4. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, Dec. 5,
1955, art. 1, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 (amended Apr. 28, 1993) [hereinafter IFC Articles of Agreement].
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one may wonder what the World Bank’s role is in the establishment of corporate responsibility standards.
Among the different corporate activities subject to public
scrutiny, the oil sector has one of the worst human rights reputations. Oil companies have been accused of supporting dictatorial regimes, using repressive armed forces to their own benefit,
and externalizing the costs of the oil production on host communities that seldom receive a fair share of the benefits.5 However, in the last few years, corporate discourse has experienced
an unprecedented shift. Companies now seem to be aware that
the traditional “mind your own business” stance cannot be publicly maintained without suffering adverse marketing consequences.6 At least nominally, oil transnationals acknowledge
that the criteria for success are broader than in the past.7 Major corporations are eager to declare that corporate responsibility builds shareholder value.8 For better or for worse, codes of
conduct have been adopted in an attempt to respond to the
mounting pressures on corporations to acknowledge, measure,
and disclose their broader social responsibilities. The response
is very patchy due to the lack of a legal framework on comp anies’ duties and the lack of enforcement mechanisms, other
than public pressure, and, occasionally, the threat of sanctions
by host governments.9
5. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbjorn Eide et al.
eds., 2000).
6. See, e.g., S HELL INTE RNATIONAL LIMITED, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE:
S HELL ON S USTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.shell.com/
home/media-en/downloads/publications/there_is_no_alternative_12072002.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
7. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, Contributing to Sustainable Development: A Management Primer, available at www.oikos.stgallen.org/international/shellprimer.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). John
Elkinton argues that in the twenty-first century, successful business will need
to take into account a “triple bottom line” consisting in economic performance,
environmental sustainability and social justice. John Elkington, The Triple
Bottom Line for Twenty-First Century Business, in COMPANIES IN A WORLD OF
CONFLICT: NGOS, S ANCTIONS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 32, 32 (John
Mitchell ed., 1998).
8. Chevron Texaco, Social Responsibility, at http://www.chevrontexaco.
com/social_responsibility/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
9. As one commentator points out, “one could easily write a book describing the vast variety of codes that are being advocated by groups of all persuasions.” However:
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This paper will argue that a closer look at the World Bank’s
Operational Policies (“OPs”) may be helpful in setting minimum
benchmarks in oil exploitation projects. First, the question is
particularly pertinent with regard to the oil market, because
the World Bank has broad experience in financing expansive
infrastructure and natural resource projects.10 The areas in
which the World Bank has developed guidelines tackle issues
where oil investments are likely to cause problems, such as indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, and the environment.11 Moreover, the World Bank claims to have assumed the
risk of ensuring that large oil exploitation projects become a
vehicle for welfare.12 More oil developments are to be expected
in the future, as the World Bank has stated that the financing
of petroleum projects is “of the highest priority for Bank Group
support.”13
This field of investment, however, is a controversial one.
Proof of this is the launching of the Extractive Industries Review

one would be hard pressed to write more than a few pages if one were
to report the research evidence of the effectiveness of these codes, as
to intended outcomes, verification of claims, made . . . and above all,
evidence of their sustained relevance and viability under various cultural and political frameworks, economic and competitive industry
conditions and institutional organisational constraints.
S. Prakash Sethi, Gaps in Research in the Formulation, Implementation and
Effectiveness Measurement of International Codes of Conduct, in GLOBAL
CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 117, 119 (Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000).
10. BERGESEN & LUNDE , supra note 2, at 110–111. In fact, during its early
years, the Bank concentrated on infrastructure projects.
11. See generally The World Bank, World Bank Operational Manual, at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter World Bank Operational Manual].
12. The World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and
Pipeline Project, Questions and Answers, Why is the Bank Group Involved?, at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/questions/index.htm (last updated Aug.
15, 2002) [hereinafter Questions and Answers].
13. See Project Appraisal Document on Proposed International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development Loans to the Tchad Oil Transportation Company, S.A. and Cameroon Oil Transportation Company, S.A. for a Petroleum
Development and Pipeline Project, The World Bank Report No. 19343 AFR,
Apr.
13,
2000,
at
20,
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/10/21/0000949
46_00102111244720/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document].
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(“The Review”) by the World Bank in 2001. The Review seeks
to open a consultation process with governments, industries,
non-government organizations (“NGOs”) and academics in order
to ascertain what role the World Bank might play with regard
to delicate questions such as environmental and social sustainability, revenue sharing, human rights protection, and the effects of extractive industries on host communities.14
In all likelihood, the World Bank’s experience and leve rage
may be relevant to the promotion of corporate responsibility
because it incorporates project guidelines into contractual
documents, and therefore makes them legally binding on borrowers.15 The furtherance of corporate responsibility through
contractual mechanisms should be the subject of study at a
moment in which the voluntary approach taken by internationally developed codes of conduct, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) guidelines, has been
considered unsatisfactory.16
Even when the World Bank is not sponsoring a project, it may
still act as a trendsetter. The World Bank’s technical assistance
may encourage states to adopt the Bank’s OP as internal measures, even in projects the Bank is not involved in.17 By the
same token, in an environment of growing demands upon pri14. Extractive Industries Review, What exactly is this Review? (Frequently
Asked Questions), at http://www.eireview.org/eir/eirhome.nsf/EnglishOther
Links/faq?opendocument (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
15. The World Bank Operational Guidelines contain express references to
the incorporation of the Operational Directives and Policies in the loan documents. See World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 11; World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples ¶ 20 (Sept.
1991), [hereinafter World Bank OD]; World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 30 (June 1990) (according to which the borrower’s obligation to
carry out the Resettlement Plan is enshrined in a legally binding document);
World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policy 4.01: Environmental
Assessment (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter World Bank OP].
16. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational
Corporations: The Sullivan and McBride Principles, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE : T HE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
S YSTEM 418, 419 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (describing internationally developed codes of conduct as failures).
17. Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International Institutions
as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples,
in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL L AW: ESSAYS IN H ONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE
323, 323 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999).
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vate investors, the steps taken by multilateral lenders may provide states with guidelines about what standards they should
apply to be on the “safe side.” However, in order for this influence to be useful in practice, the World Bank’s financing needs
to be attractive to investors. Abundant literature exists regarding the World Bank’s leverage upon borrowing states.18 As to
private investment, economists have mixed opinions on whether
the Bank really catalyses private investment flow.19 Although
the World Bank’s role as “norm generator” may be highly
dependent on its economic success as an investment catalyst,
the two are not entirely co-dependent. The OPs’ application
may also be significant because other development banks
already follow this trend. In addition, other financing agencies
often want the Bank’s imprimatur because it is a demanding
lender with e xternal credibility.20
Although public attention towards the relations between corporations and international financial institutions (“IFIs”) has
increased in the last few years, investors’ interest in IFIs is not
a recent phenomenon. In the 1970s, oil companies had already
declared that they valued IFI involvement in foreign exploitation ve ntures, not only for the contributions they made, but also
because of their stabilizing role, which could help to ease tension in the company-host government relations.21 In addition to
this conciliating role, the World Bank’s involvement in oil exploitation ventures in the 1990s may have become a crucial factor in the marketing strategy of companies willing to avoid human rights scandals.22
It would be naive to ignore the difficulties and constraints
that the World Bank faces in the development of a genuine corporate responsibility policy vis-à-vis its clients. So far, the
18. See, e.g., BIPLAB D ASGUPTA, S TRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT , GLOBAL T RADE
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (1998). See also Jonathan
Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV . HUM . RTS. J. 159 (1993).
19. See generally Graham Bird et al., Do the Multilaterals Catalyse Other
Capital Flows?, A Case Study Analysis, 21 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 483
(2000). See also DANI RODRIK , WHY IS THERE M ULTILATERAL LENDING? (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5160, 1995).
20. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 336.
21. KAMAL HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT :
CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONALS AND GOVERNMENTS 70 (1979).
22. Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 22.
AND THE
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World Bank’s ideology has led it to promote legal regimes in
which investors’ rights took pre-eminence over their obligations.23 Moreover, the World Bank’s own institutional interests
may render toothless the application of a corporate responsibility policy, as there may be a practical contradiction between the
roles of banker/investor and standard setter/monitor.24 This
conflict is especially acute in investments in which the IFC itself acquires a stake in the project.25 However, these difficulties
do not represent a theoretical impediment for the reinforcement
of the World Bank’s social and environmental guidelines, as it
will be argued below.
Commentators have stressed that the World Bank is failing
because of its broadening mandate.26 They argue that the
World Bank has taken over many areas that were previously
within the UN’s domain, and has at the same time lost its main
asset — its expertise in a discrete number of issues.27 One of
the suggested avenues for change is a return to traditional project IBRD loans and an emphasis on the role of the MIGA and
IFC.28
This paper will study the standards imposed by the World
Bank’s policies and explore its capacity to act, not only as a responsible investor, but also as a trendsetter in the petroleum
sector. Section II will analyze the substantive and procedural
benchmarks imposed by the World Bank’s policies. Section III
will focus on the most important example in which these
23. For a critique of the World Bank’s Policies on these grounds, see Anthony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 243, 253
(2000); Cahn, supra note 18, at 169; KEVIN D ANAHER, 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH : THE
CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL M ONETARY FUND
(1994); DASGUPTA , supra note 18, at 87.
24. In this respect, Ibrahim Shihata, the Bank’s former General Counsel,
argued that a proactive democracy and human rights policy would lead to the
politization of the Bank and its loss of credibility in the financial markets. See
Ibrahim Shihata, Democracy and Development, 46 INT ’L & COMP. L. Q. 635,
642 (1997).
25. The IFC also carries out equity investments; it purchases a stake in a
project which it eventually sells off later. See IFC, IFC Financial Products, at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/basics/basics.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2002).
26. BERGESEN & LUNDE , supra note 2, at 134–40.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 139.
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benchmarks have been applied in practice — the
Chad/Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project
(“Chad/Cameroon Project” or “Project”). One of the main objections made to a greater involvement of the IBRD in the human
rights situation of borrowing countries is its dramatic
North/South dimension.29 In other words, it is not very reassuring that a powerful institution dominated by a small number of
countries, that has already intervened widely in its clients’ affairs (many times to the detriment of human rights), will use its
power to impose human rights norms. Nevertheless, a properly
reinforced application of the World Bank’s standards to its clients in the private sector does not give rise to North/South fairness questions. With this idea in mind, Section IV will explore
the possibility of reinforcing the social and environmental policies of the World Bank’s private sector branches, the IFC and
the MIGA.
II. THE WORLD BANK’S OPERATIONAL STANDARDS .
Originally, the Bank’s operational standards were conceived
as aspirational targets.30 Over time, the standards have increasingly acquired a mandatory status.31 The standards did
not originate through a thought-out legislative process, but,
rather, were created on an ad hoc basis, as problems arose with
particular projects.32 The first standards were adopted in the
1970s. 33 After 1987, these original standar ds began to be consolidated into Operational Directives (“ODs”), which included
29. The number of votes in the Bank’s Board of Governors corresponds to
the number of shares that a country has subscribed to. The largest shareholders are the U.S. (16% of the votes), Japan (7.87%), and Germany (4.49%).
Since the most developed countries do not take loans from the Bank, the system is one in which the countries having more weight on the decisions never
have to bear their consequences. See The World Bank, IBRD: Votes and Subscriptions, at http://www.worldbank.org [retrieve chart from the following
path: “Home” > “About Us” >“Organization” > “Executive Boards” > “IBRD:
Votes and Subscriptions”] (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
30. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance:
The World Bank Operational Standards, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE :
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDNG NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL S YSTEM 281,
283 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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elements of policy, procedure, and guidance.34 During the last
few years, the World Bank has converted the Operational Directives into different norms called Operational Policies, Bank
Procedures (“BPs”), and Good Practices. The invoked rationale
for this conversion is to increase clarity for the staff, the Inspection Panel, and the affected parties.35
The application of the Bank’s operational standards is
fraught with a series of difficulties. First, the standards do not
use normative language but are framed as a set of practical instructions to be followed in particular situations. Second, not
all the standards have the same normative value. Realistically
speaking, only the Operational Policies, Bank Procedures, and
certain aspects of the Operational Directives are binding on the
Bank’s staff, while Good Practices serve merely as recomme ndations.36 Finally, not all of the institutions in the World Bank
apply exactly the same rules, although the IBRD’s set of policies
are the most highly developed.37 Therefore, IFC and MIGA
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Bank’s OPs are defined as covering:
matters of importance to the Bank’s core objectives and provide Bank
staff direction and guidance in pursuit of those objectives. OPs are
short, focused statements that follow from the Bank’s Articles of
Agreement, the general conditions and policies approved by the
Board. They establish the parameters for the conduct of operations,
and also describe the circumstances under which exceptions to policy
are admissible and clarify who authorises such exceptions.
Bank Procedures (“BPs”) explain how the Bank’s staff carries out the OPs, by
describing the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bank wide
consistency and quality. World Bank Operational Manual, Definitions, supra
note 15, at ¶¶ 3–5.
Only the violation of a binding policy triggers the jurisdiction of the
World Bank Inspection Panel. See IBRD Resolution No. 93–10, IDA Resolution No. 93–6, The World Bank Inspection Panel, Sept. 22, 1993 [hereinafter
IBRD/IDA Resolution] and Conclusions of the Board’s Second Review of the
Inspection
Panel
(Apr.
20,
1999),
at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WResolution?openview&count=
500000 (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
37. IFC and MIGA have developed their own policies although they apply
IBRD’s policies when they do not have their own specific safeguard policies.
The World Bank Operational Manual list of specific policies is much more
extensive than that of the IFC and MIGA. Compare IFC, Safeguard Policies,
at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/Safeguard/safeguard.htm [hereinafter IFC
Safeguard
Policies],
and
MIGA,
Disclosure
Policies,
at
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policies are inspired by the IBRD and apply an IBRD policy
when they do not have their own specific policy.38
The World Bank Operations Manual contains a broad set of
policies that are applicable to technical, environmental, social
and cultural issues.39 The policies on “Environmental Assessment,” “Indigenous Peoples,” and “Involuntary Resettlement”
have been considered pillar policies.40 It is worth undertaking a
more detailed analysis of these policies because they are also
the most relevant to human rights issues that are likely to appear in oil exploitation projects, i.e. environmental degradation,
displacement of peoples, and the collision, in some cases, with
the rights of indigenous communities. The three policies impose both substantive requirements, such as minimum benc hmarks relating to the quality of the project, and procedural obligations on borrowers.41
In the substantive aspects, according to the OP on Environmental Assessment, projects financed by the Bank have to be
environmentally sound and sustainable.42 In terms of project
quality, this means that preventive and mitigative measures
should take into account all aspects of the environment, such as
water, air, and land.43 The OP establishes a higher benc hmark
than mere respect for local legislation, as the World Bank also
undertakes not to finance projects that could potentially contravene a country’s treaty obligations.44 This policy provides an
added value if the borrower is in a situation of non-compliance
with its international obligations. Moreover, the World Bank’s
policies require a project to include components that strengthen

http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/policies.htm, with World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 15.
38. See IFC, Environmental and Social Review Procedure, Introduction, at
http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/ESRP/esrp.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter IFC Environmental & Social Review]; MIGA, Environmental and
Social Review Procedures, at http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose
/soc_rev.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter MIGA Environmental &
Social Review].
39. See World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 15.
40. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 30, at 289.
41. See text accompanying notes 42–80.
42. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, supra note 15, ¶ 1.
The same requirement is found in IFC and MIGA’s policies.
43. Id. ¶ 2.
44. Id. ¶ 3.

File: Uriz Base Macro final.doc

86

Created on: 11/2/2002 6:56 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

[Vol. 28:1

a borrower’s environmental capacity, both legal and institutional, when it is weak.45
A project must also comply with the Pollution Prevention and
Abatement Handbook, which lays down pollution preve ntion
and abatement measures and the World Bank’s emission level
requirements.46 The OP, however, contains a relatively openended exception, providing management with a wide discretionary power. After taking into account a borrower country’s
legislation and local conditions, the Environmental Assessment
may recommend alternative emission levels and pollution prevention measures.47 However, it is the World Bank that ultimately decides on the adequate level of justification.48
The nature of p rocedural guarantees depend on project classification. Projects receiving World Bank financing can be classified as Category A, B, or C, depending on their impact.49 Category A projects are those having a sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented environmental impact and requiring a full environmental assessment.50 Major oil development projects are
generally Category A, although the OP does not define the word
“major.”51 Normally, projects affecting indigenous people or
causing invo luntary resettlement are also Category A projects.52
An environmental assessment of a Category A project requires
an analysis of the feasible alternatives (including the “without
project” one).53 Category A projects’ environmental assessments
also entail extensive consultation and disclosure requirements,
which should be initiated as soon as possible.54 Furthermore,
the borrower should report to the World Bank on its compliance
with environmental measures, including: an environmental
45. Id. ¶ 14.
46. Id. ¶ 6. The same requirement is found in IFC and MIGA’s policies.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 7.
49. Id. ¶ 8.
50. Id. ¶ 8(a). IFC and MIGA’s policies contain the same requirement.
51. See IFC, Environmental and Social Review Procedures, Annex B: Project Categorization Examples, at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/enviro/Review_
Procedure_Main/Review_Procedure/Annex_B/annex_b.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2002) [hereinafter IFC Project Categorization Examples].
52. Id.
53. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, supra note 15, ¶
8(a).
54. Id. ¶ 15.
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management plan, mitigation, and monitoring measures.55
There are fewer consultation requirements in Category B projects and none for those in Category C. Consequently, the project classification greatly impacts the affected populations’ human rights.
The recently adopted OP on Involuntary Resettlement56 directs the World Bank to try to avoid displacement, and if displacement is unavoidable, to fully compensate the displaced
persons and to assist them in their efforts to improve their living standards or, at least, “to restore them.”57 This policy establishes a number of rules on compensation in order to ensure
that resettled populations receive prompt and effective compensation at the full replacement cost of their assets.58 It also refers to the need of granting preference to land compensation
over cash compensation, especially in cases where the community livelihood is land-based.59 In some cases, these requirements may go beyond what local laws have established. This
OP also requires that resettlement plans pay special attention
to the needs of vulnerable groups — those living below the poverty line; those who are landless; the elderly, women, and children; and the indigenous peoples or displaced persons whose
rights are not yet recognized by local law.60
In addition to compensation obligations, the OP states that
adequate public services and infrastructure development should
be provided to new communities. This requirement is based on
the idea that conditions and services in host communities
should improve or, at least, not deteriorate.61 Where it is necessary to minimize the negative effects of displacement, resettlement plans should include measures to ensure that the displaced persons are provided with development assistance, such
as credit facilities or job opportunities.62
55. Id. ¶ 20.
56. In December 2001, the World Bank adopted OP and BP 4.12, replacing
OD 4.30 on Involuntary Resettlement. World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 11.
57. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, supra note 15, ¶¶ 2(a),
(c).
58. Id. ¶ 6(a)(3).
59. Id. ¶¶ 9–12.
60. Id. ¶ 8.
61. Id. ¶ 13(b).
62. Id. ¶ 6(c)(iii).
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During the resettlement process, the borrower must put in
place mechanisms permitting that both the displaced and the
host communities are consulted on resettlement options and
participate throughout the process, including monitoring.63
Apart from guaranteeing compensation, the plan must ensure
that displaced persons receive information about their rights
and options in connection with the resettlement. Furthermore,
displaced persons must be consulted, and provided with feasible
resettlement alternatives64 and grievance mechanisms.65
Read together, the OP 4.12 and the Bank Procedure 4.12 provide for project supervision in rather general terms, leaving a
margin of discretion to the regional vice-president to determine
appropriate measures.66 However, there are a certain number
of criteria establishing how supervision should be undertaken.
The mission of supervision should include providing social, financial, legal, and technical expertise, as well as assessing
compliance with the project’s legal documentation.67 Bank supervision has to continue until all the resettlement measures
have been implemented.68 Once the project is completed, the
Bank issues an “Implementation Completion Report,” which
will draw lessons to be applied in future operations.69 If the
objectives of the resettlement plan have not been attained, the
Report may include further measures, including increased supervision by the World Bank.70
Although the Indigenous Peoples’ Operational Directive
(“OD”) does not refer to any international human rights standards, it does include substantive benchmarks.71 Development
63. Id. ¶¶ 6(a), 11(a).
64. Id. ¶¶ 6(a)(i), (ii).
65. Id. ¶ 13(a).
66. Id. ¶ 24; World Bank BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, ¶¶ 14–16.
67. World Bank BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, supra note 66, ¶¶ 13–
14.
68. Id. ¶ 16.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. OD 4.20: Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15. The Indigenous Peoples
OD is also in the process of being reviewed. It also applies to the IFC and
MIGA, whose specific policies on Indigenous Peoples will be adopted once the
IBRD issues a definitive version of its policy. Kingsbury finds “a troubling
feature the fact that the Bank has neither committed itself to conform to the
standards of the ILO Convention 169 as minimum requirements in evaluating
projects, nor undertaken not to support projects that might place a borrowing
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activities are required to support production systems adapted to
the needs and environment of indigenous peoples.72 The OD
states that the advice given to the borrowers should focus on
the improvement of indigenous peoples’ legislation and the recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights.73 The OD refers to
specific services to be provided to indige nous peoples, such as
education, health, and training. In addition, the OD stresses
that traditional health care methods be considered in planning
delivery systems for health care.74
Among the procedural guarantees, the OD is established on
the assumption that the issues dealing with Indigenous Peoples
must be based on the informed consent of the indigenous communities themselves.75 Under the OD, the borrower is obliged
to prepare a culturally appropriate plan for Indigenous Peoples.76 The content of the plan itself should also satisfy some
procedural obligations, such as a strategy for local participation,77 an implementation schedule with benchmarks where
progress can be measured at appropriate intervals, expert
monitoring, and a detailed financing plan.78 In the appraisal
process, the World Bank must be satisfied that the indigenous
peoples have participated meaningfully in the development of
the plan.79
Together with other World Bank policies, the above rules
provide the framework applied to the Chad/Cameroon Project.
As discussed below, the application of the World Bank policies
to the Chad/Cameroon Project serves as an example of how to
turn risky oil developments into investments beneficial to the
affected communities.80

country in violation of its Convention 169 obligations.” Kingsbury, supra note
17, at 326–327.
72. World Bank OD 4.20: Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15, ¶ 14(e).
73. Id. ¶¶ 15(c), 17.
74. Id. ¶ 15(e).
75. Id. ¶ 7.
76. Id. ¶ 14(a).
77. Id. ¶ 15(d).
78. Id. ¶¶ 15(g), (h), (i).
79. Id. ¶ 18.
80. Questions and Answers, supra note 12.
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III. THE CHAD/CAMEROON PROJECT — AN EXAMPLE OF THE
APPLICATION OF THE WORLD BANK’S POLICIES .
On June 6, 2000, the Executive Directors of the World Bank
approved its participation in the Chad/Cameroon Project.81 The
approval process had been repeatedly delayed after a long high
profile campaign bringing together a coalition of NGOs, public
personalities, and universities criticizing the Project.82 The extraction and pipeline project will drill oil from three oilfields
(Miandoum, Kome and Bolobo) at the Doba basin (Southern
Chad) and transport it, for export, through a 1,070 km. pipeline
to the Atlantic Ocean port of Kribi in Cameroon.83 Because construction is expected to last nearly four years, oil will not flow
until 2004.84 Oil production will last about 25–30 years.85 The
total cost of the Project is $3.7 billion dollars.86 The World Bank
financing includes the participation of both the IBRD and the
IFC.87
ExxonMobil, in its capacity as project operator, will carry out
the drilling on behalf of the consortium.88 Two joint-venture
pipeline companies — Tchad Oil Transportation Company
(“TOTCO”) and the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company
(“COTCO”)89 — will operate the export system.90 ExxonMobil,
81. Id. See also The World Bank Group, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
Development
and
Pipeline
Project,
Project
Overview,
at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro_overview.htm (last updated
Aug. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Project Overview]. In this section, I draw extensively from Genoveva Hernández Uriz, To Lend Or Not To Lend: Oil, Human
Rights, And The World Bank's Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV . H UM . RTS. J.
197 (2001).
82. Letter from Eighty-six NGOs in Twenty-eight Countries to James D.
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, Concerning the Chad/Cameroon Oil
& Pipeline (July 9, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wolfensohn Letter]
(calling for the suspension of World Bank support until full respect for human
rights and compliance with World Bank policies could be fully guaranteed).
83. ESSO EXPLORATION AND P RODUCTION CHAD INC ., ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, EXECUTIVE S UMMARY & UPDATE , chs. 4, 9, available at
http://www.esso.com/eaff/essochad/documentation/englishsummary [hereinafter ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT].
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3-1.
86. Id. at 2-6. See also Project Overview, supra note 81.
87. See Project Overview, supra note 81.
88. ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ch. 2.
89. Id. at 2-6. Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. is the Consortium designated operator for the oilfield. The pipeline transportation system
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Petronas and ChevronTexaco will jointly hold about 80% of the
shares in the pipeline companies.91 Chad owns minority interests in both pipeline companies, while Cameroon only holds a
minority stake in COTCO, the Cameroon pipeline company.92
Under the current contractual agreements, the consortium will
be in charge of financing, managing, and selling the crude oil.93
“Chad will receive a percentage of the sale proceeds in royalties,94 and Cameroon will receive transportation fees and
taxes.”95 The Project’s sponsors argue that the Project will
benefit Chad through the application of oil revenues to health,
education, rural development, and infrastructure programs.96
This will help Chad, one of the poorest and least developed
countries in the world, to alleviate poverty.
The human rights risks that the Project poses have been at
the center of an NGO campaign to halt the Project. Requesting
a two-year moratorium, critics argued that the Project should
not proceed until a number of environmental, good governance,
and human rights concerns had been resolved.97 Critics feared
that the tragic outcomes, brought on by oil exploitation in unstable environments under repressive regimes, such as in Nigeria, would be repeated in the case of Chad.98 In fact, the under-

will be owned by the Tchad Oil Transportation Company (“TOTCO”) and the
Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (“COTCO”), the two companies that
have been formed for this purpose.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2-1. Under the current agreements, Chad will receive the following direct revenues: (i) royalty payments; (ii) an upstream corporate income
tax on the consortium; (iii) a pipeline corporate income tax on TOTCO (the
pipeline company for Chad); and (iv) dividends for its equity holdings in
TOTCO and COTCO. See Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 67.
The compensation received by the Chadian government has been fixed at
12.5% of the crude oil price. The Consortium enjoys an almost full tax exemption that will not be withdrawn unless the barrel price exceeds $17. Thomas
Sotinel, Le Tchad Face aux Sirènes Pétrolières, LE M ONDE , Sept. 3, 1998, at
13, available at LEXIS, News Library, French Language News File.
95. ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, at 2-1.
96. Project Overview, supra note 81.
97. See Wolfson Letter, supra, note 82.
98. Korinna Horta, Questions Concerning the World Bank and
Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project — Makings of a New Ogoniland?
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lying human rights issues are numerous. The country has experienced an intermittent civil war.99 Ethnic politics are extremely complicated in the country, and they may be exacerbated by an unfair distribution of the oil benefits and costs.100
This risk is a real one, because the government is accused of
corruption and of managing the country’s affairs to the advantage of its leader’s ethnic clan.101 Although the current government claims to have restored democracy, it has a very deficient
record on human rights.102 For example, massive killings have
been reported in the oil producing regions.103 Chad’s extreme
poverty and underdevelopment accentuate its political instability.
The Bank, however, has enthusiastically defended the
Chad/Cameroon Project, arguing that its involvement will not
only ensure an orthodox application of environmental and social
guidelines — including the fairness of the participation process
— but also that this commercial operation will turn into a large scale development program.104 Challenging the arguments
against issuing a loan to a steady human rights violator, such
Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor? (Mar. 1, 1997), at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentID=1019&Page=1.
99. For a study of Chad’s recent history, see DERLEMARI NEBARDOUM , LE
LABYRINTHE DE L’INSTABILITE POLITIQUE AU CHAD (1998); M ARIO JOAQUIM
AZEVEDO, CHAD: A NATION IN S EARCH OF ITS FUTURE (1998).
100. U.S. DEPT. OF S TATE , CHAD COUNTRY REPORT ON H UMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1998 (1999), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/
1998_hrp_report/chad.html [hereinafter CHAD H UMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998)].
101. AGIR ICI ET S URVIE, P ROJET PÉTROLIER T CHAD-CAMEROUN, DÉS PIPÉS SUR
LE PIPE -LINE 39–40, (Les “Dossiers Noirs” de la Politique Africaine de la
France No. 13) (1999).
102. In December 1990, Colonel Idriss Déby seized power and Habre fled
the country. Robert Buijtenhuijs, Les interventions militaires françaises: le
cas du Tchad, in ETATS ET SOCIÉTÉS EN AFRIQUE F RANCOPHONE 251 (Daniel C.
Bach et Anthony A. Kirk-Greene dir., 1993). Chad has been monitored under
the Human Rights Commission confidential procedure 1503. Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Chad, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 4/1998/R.3 (1998) [hereinafter UN Report].
103. Human rights organisations reported approximately 200 extrajudicial
killings in two repressive campaigns undertaken in November 1997 and
March 1998. One hundred unarmed people were killed. See Wolfensohn Letter, supra note 82. See also CHAD HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998), supra note
100; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF S TATE , CHAD COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr (last visited Jan.
25, 2002).
104. Questions and Answers, supra note 12.
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as the Chadian government, the Bank has reacted by emphasizing that oil extraction is the only opportunity to further the
Chadian people’s economic and social rights.105 Moreover, the
Project fits into one of the Bank’s main strategic priorities —
promoting development through private sector involvement.106
The companies carrying out this investment consider the
Bank’s involvement as essential in order to mitigate their risks
and safeguard their image as “good” corporate citizens willing
to abide by high social and environmental standards.107 The
Bank affirms that it facilitates the companies’ access to credit
and mitigates their political risks.108 Whether this is actually
the case or not, oil companies in the Chad/Cameroon Project
have, in fact, relied heavily on the World Bank’s imprimatur.
Significantly, ExxonMobil publicly announced that it would not
proceed without the World Bank’s participation and acknowledged the marketing importance of a clean human rights reputation.109
The World Bank’s involvement in the Project has implied the
application of its Operational Manual to the process.110 A number of policies were applicable because the Project was not only
environmentally sensitive, having an impact on a number of
forests and natural habitats, but also involved resettlement in
the oil field areas and affected indigenous peoples in Cameroon.111 The Chad/Cameroon Project was deemed a Category A
project, thereby requiring the most robust environmental assessment, disclosure, and consultation processes.112 This process has been protracted. The consortium claims to have started
“one of the most extensive consultation efforts ever undertaken
in Africa” as early as 1993.113 Indeed, Project sponsors claim to
have held nearly 900 village -level public meetings in both countries and have put a nineteen-volume informational package
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
Chad
ment,
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 20.
Id. at 22–23.
Id.
Interview with Jean-Pierre Petit, CEO, Esso Tchad S.A., in N’djamena,
(Jul. 20, 1999) (on file with author). See also Project Appraisal Docusupra note 13, at 22.
ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ch. 2.
Id. ch. 7.
Id. chs. 4 & 9.
Id. at 9-1.
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about the Project at the public disposal in reading rooms
throughout Chad and Cameroon.114 The debate has been intense at the local NGO level.115 Nevertheless, certain problems
flaw the consultation process, such as the presence of armed
guards through out the consultation and the content of the consultation materials, which seem to be more suitable for advertising than for meaningful discourse.116
Similar issues arise when looking closer at other aspects of
the Project, such as the Environmental Management Plan
(“EMP”) and the resettlement process. The Bank turned down
the first Environmental Assessment (“EA”) submitted by the
Consortium and the two governments as unsatisfactory.117 The
definitive version of the EMP established a series of measures
in order to ensure that the facilities are as least disruptive as
possible.118 However, NGOs still complain about the lack of certainty of environmental safeguards.119 More troubling, ho wever, is the shifting of the monitoring responsibility to the go v-

114. Id. Apart from village meetings, the information campaign has conducted one-on-one interviews with the concerned populations. According to
the consortium, consultation has taken place in several languages. The project sponsors argue that, apart from the Environmental Assessment and consultation process, World Bank involvement has placed pressure on the
Chadian government to modify its legislation and set up national mechanisms
to oversee the oil revenues.
115. See Alan Beattie, World Bank Team Attacks Own Oil Project,
FINANCIAL TIMES , Aug. 19, 2002, at 4; Gus Constantine, Rights Record Defended in Bid for Pipeline Fund, WASH. TIMES , July 22, 2001, at A10.
116. An important tool of the consultation process consisted of a twentyminute video shown in the villages. But the video’s explanation takes place at
a very fast pace with relatively loud background music and stresses only the
positive aspects of the oil project. Government officials appear in the video,
confidently assuring that oil extraction will actually take place. This certainty, expressed by officials in a country always subjected to authoritarian
rule, turns the video into propaganda, rather than information or consultation. (This information was gathered pursuant to a field study by the author
at Esso Tchad S.A., N’djamena, Chad (Jul. 20, 1999)). Furthermore, although
the nineteen-volume information package is very comprehensive, it cannot be
very effective in a country with a 49.7% illiteracy rate and where many people
cannot even reach the reading rooms.
117. AGIR ICI ET S URVIE, supra note 101, at 44–46.
118. For example, the pipeline will be buried one meter below ground and
there will be a monitoring system to prevent oil spills. See Questions and
Answers, supra note 12, ¶ 4.
119. Wolfensohn Letter, supra note 82.

File: Uriz Base Macro final.doc

2002]

Created on: 11/2/2002 6:56 PM

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

THE WORLD BANK & THE OIL INDUSTRY

95

ernments of Chad and Cameroon.120 There is a danger that the
technical advice provided by the Bank to both governments
would not be enough to ensure that they will have the capacity
or the will to satisfactorily carry out that role.
The creation of independent oversight mechanisms represents more innovative legal developments. These mechanisms
work both internally through the reform of Chadian law, and
externally through the appointment of international supervising bodies. Under the pressure from the World Bank, the
Chadian government has adopted revenue management measures, described by the Bank’s literature as proof of the Chadian
government’s commitment to clean management.121 The measures consist mainly of a law — the Revenue Management Law
— which states how the oil proceeds will be distributed and creates a monitoring committee. The monitoring committee is
formed by representatives of different constituencies in Chad,
including four civil society representatives.122
On the international level, one of the loan conditions was the
creation of an independent International Advisory Group
(“IAG”) to provide an additional guarantee to the project monitoring.123 The IAG advises the governments of Chad and Cameroon on project implementation; identifying any potential problems. The IAG reports its findings to the World Bank President
and to the governments of both Chad and Cameroon.124 The
structure and functioning of the IAG, as defined by the terms of
120. Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 128–130.
121. Id. at 22.
122. LAW ON REVENUE M ANAGEMENT , Act No. 001/PR/99, Republic of Chad
(1999), reprinted in Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 101 [hereinafter OIL REVENUE M ANAGEMENT L AW].
123. Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Appoints International
Advisory Group on the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline
Project, No. 2001/235/S (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org
[hereinafter World Bank Press Release]. The work of the advisory group will
be supplemented by a panel of independent experts advising the governments
of Chad and Cameroon Environmental and Social Experts Panel (“ESEP”) and
an External Compliance Monitoring Group (“ECMG”) in charge of monitoring
the implementation of the Environmental Management Plan.
124. THE WORLD BANK , T HE CHAD-CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE
PROJECT INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY G ROUP ON THE CHAD-CAMEROON PIPELINE
AND R ELATED P ROJECTS — TERMS OF R EFERENCE , ¶¶ 5, 17, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/iag_tor_en.pdf (last visited Jan.
25, 2002) [hereinafter CHAD-C AMEROON TERMS OF REFERENCE ].
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reference released by the Bank, seeks to ensure the monitoring
body’s independence. The IAG is composed of six independent
experts of international prestige.125 The IAG travels to Chad at
least twice a year and defines the focus of its own work.126
When this long, highly publicized, and contested process is
compared to oil investments in other repressive countries, such
as Burma or Sudan, it seems more likely that the oil companies
and Chadian and Camerounian governments will be closely
scrutinized. This scrutiny will hopefully improve their behavior. Moreover, the discussions over the Project have fostered a
participation culture within local communities, which will be
difficult to eliminate.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that the Project, presented as an
ideal model to the international community, will end up being a
failure. The Bank’s disregard for certain realities of life in
Chad and Cameroon, specifically concerning good governance
and human rights, may render the guarantees cosmetic or, at
best, only confront problems partially. The attitude of the
Bank’s staff has been quite defensive throughout the process,
and one wonders whether their treatment of the problems is a
defensive reaction to the criticism or the result of a genuine
plan.127
A good example of this concern is the oversight board created
under the Revenue Management Law. The board consists of a
Supreme Court magistrate, two Members of Parliament, four
high-ranking officials, and four civil society representatives.128
In principle, one might well think that a board with such broad
representation would be perfectly suited to guarantee the
transparency and fairness of the expenses. However, a closer
125. Id. ¶ 4. See also World Bank Press Release, supra note 123.
126. See World Bank Press Release, supra note 123; ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 6, 8.
127. At the time of this writing, the project has already been the subject of
an Inspection Panel request for investigation. In September 2001, the Inspection Panel had issued a report recommending that the Executive Directors
open a full investigation. THE WORLD B ANK, INSPECTION P ANEL, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON REQUEST FOR INSPECTION (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf.
128. OIL REVENUE M ANAGEMENT L AW, supra note 122, art. 16. In spite of the
amendment, increasing the number of civil society representatives, the number of votes that is likely to endorse the government’s positions still represent
a majority.
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inspection of its composition and within the Chadian context
shows two fundamental weaknesses. Given the lack of independence of the judiciary and the non-existence of parliame ntary opposition, five of the nine votes are likely to endorse the
government’s position.129 Another excellent example of the
Board’s weakness is the public finance management training
the World Bank provides to parliamentarians. The World
Bank’s technical advice would be extremely helpful if a meaningful parliamentary opposition existed. However, such training is of little value when members of parliament who oppose
the Project are sent to jail.130 Thus, judges and members of parliament will fail to perform their jobs properly if they are subject to removal or if they must succumb, through clientele relations, to the political party in power.
Finally, an unsolved problem is what will happen when international public pressure stops. The IAG is expected to work
for up to ten years.131 However, if Chad does not meet its commitments, it is plausible that the World Bank might apply pressure through further lending or through debt relief programs.132
Nevertheless, the mandate of the IAG should at least be renewable in order to guarantee a long-term oversight mechanism.

129. Institutions in Chad are dysfunctional and the country lacks a strong
parliamentary opposition. See UN Report, supra note 102. See also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL , AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2001, available at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webafrcountries/CHAD?OpenDoc
ument. The judiciary has not consolidated its independence from the executive. The government institutions act with impunity and without accountability. For a detailed analysis, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, T CHAD: U.N. P AYS
S OUMIS A L’A RBITRAIRE DES FORCES DE S ECURITE AVEC LA COMPLAISANCE DE PAYS
ETRANGERS (1996).
130. Interview with Ngarléjy Yorongar Le Moïban, Chadian Member of
Parliament and opposition member in N’djaména, Chad (July, 1997) (on file
with author). See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
123–124 (1999). See also Union Interparlementaire, Comité des Droits de
l’Homme des Parlementaires. Rapport de la Délégation du Comité sur sa
Mission au Tchad (21–27 Novembre 1998. Cas No. Chd/01 Ngarléjy Yorongar)
(on file with the author).
131. CHAD-C AMEROON — TERMS OF REFERENCE , supra note 124, ¶ 11.
132. Interview with Mary Barton-Dock, World Bank Representative in
Chad, N’djamena (Jul. 26, 1999) (on file with author).
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND THE
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY.
Private sector development has become a main priority for
the World Bank.133 An analysis of the IFC and the MIGA as
promoters of responsible investment is justified because they
are the fastest growing agencies within the World Bank.134 The
demand for their services has significantly increased as direct
investment continues to grow in developing countries.135 The
role of the IFC is especially relevant to the oil sector, because
the extraction industries currently occupy the third place in the
IFC’s loan portfolio.136 The MIGA’s role in the oil industry is
currently smaller, representing only 3% of the industry’s operations.137 Though lesser involved, this article will also refer to
the MIGA’s policies and procedures, because MIGA shares the
same mechanisms for addressing the grievances of affected

133. Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, in
LIABILITY OF M ULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL L AW 17, 35
(Menno J. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Ziarifi eds., 2000). During 1997 and 1998,
the World Bank launched the initiative Business Partners for Development
(“BPD”), an informal global network of business, governments, and civil society with the Word Bank Group as an equal partner. The BPD aims to demonstrate the positive impact of tri-sector partnership both for the development
and the business impact through the integration of corporate responsibility
values in business.
134. BANK INFORMATION CENTER, TOOLKITS FOR ADVOCATES: THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND THE M ULTILATERAL INVESTMENT
GUARANTEE AGENCY, available at http://www.bicusa.org/toolkits/ifcmiga.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT].
135. Id. In March 1998, MIGA’s Board approved a recommendation to the
Board of Governors on a general capital increase, doubling the Agency’s capital base from $1 billion to $2 billion. The objective of this capital increase is to
support the growth of MIGA’s gross exposure, which is expected to increase to
approximately $10–15 billion. See Motomichi Ikawa, Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, in THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL L AW 21, 24 (Edith
Brown Weiss et al. eds., 1999). The capital increase was blocked by the U.S.
136. This represents 15% of IFC’s portfolio. Loans granted in 1999 to the
extractive sector amounted to $789.9 million. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT, supra
note 134.
137. Id. at 5. This amounts to $111 million. According to an official, MIGA
has entered into very few contracts in the oil & gas sector. It currently has
three gas pipeline projects (all are buried), one offshore oil and gas production
project, and one small LPG terminal.
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communities as the IFC, and due to the MIGA’s vocation to act
as a standard-setter for the petroleum industry.138
The IFC was created in 1956 as the private sector arm of the
World Bank Group.139 Its purpose is “to further economic deve lopment by encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise in member countries.”140 Since its creation, the IFC has
worked with nearly 2000 companies in 129 countries.141 The
IFC offers its clients a number of services at market rates. The
best known of these services is project financing. There are
several types of loan products. The IFC grants loans directly to
investors (so-called “A loans”), which are made on regular market terms.142 The IFC also mobilizes private capital through
syndicated loans with a group of banks (so-called “B loans”).143
Additionally, the IFC also carries out equity investments: it
purchases a stake in a project, which it eventually sells.144 Between debt and equity, some intermediate products exist, such
as subordinated loans.145 In this case, the loans are paid back to
the IFC only after other lenders have been paid back.146 Only
through its lending operations, does the IFC have a significant
impact on responsible investment. Currently, about 220 commercial banks and institutional investors participate in IFC’s B
138. Ikawa, supra note 135, at 26.
139. The creation of the IFC and IDA may be seen partly as the compensation for the failure to create a Special UN Fund for Economic Development
(“SUNFED”). Developing countries proposed to create such an agency under
UN control to foster grant or soft loan based investment support. SUNFED
can be seen as the first sustained effort to use collective strength by a UN
majority to force structural change in the world economy to the benefit of poor
countries. BERGESEN & L UNDE , supra note 2, at 41.
140. IFC Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1.
141. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 1.
142. IFC,
Loans
for
IFC’s
Own
Account:
A-loans,
at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/loans/loans.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2002).
143. IFC,
Syndicated
Loans:
The
B-loan
program,
at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/syndication/syndication.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2002).
144. IFC,
Equity
Financing,
at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/equity/equity.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2002).
145. IFC,
Quasi-Equity
Financing:
C-loans,
at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/quasi/quasi.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2002).
146. Id.
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loans, most of them from Europe, North America, and Asia.147
These investors participate in a broad range of industries, including mining and energy.148 In March 2002, the IFC was administering $6.6 billion in loans for others.149
The MIGA started its work in 1988.150 So far, it has insured
around 300 investments in 52 countries.151 The objective of the
MIGA Convention is to promote the flow of productive foreign
investment from the developed to the developing countries.152

147. IFC, The Syndicated Loan Program, at http://www.ifc.org/syndications
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
148. Id.
149. IFC
Annual
Report
2001,
Portfolio
Review,
at
http://www.ifc.org/ar2001/review/portfolio.html. Apart from its project financing services, the IFC offers other advisory and risk management services. The
advising consists in the provision of technical assistance to promote private
sector growth in developing countries. This advice can be targeted to the private sector (e.g., helping entrepreneurs develop project proposals) or to the
public sector (e.g., assisting with private sector institution building). The
technical assistance to developing countries has actively promoted privatisation as a means of furthering private sector development and the attraction of
foreign investment. The legal and technical advice is carried out through the
Technical Assistance Trust Funds Program (“TAFT”). The IFC has also created the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (“FIAS”) to assist developing
countries in how to attract larger amounts of foreign direct investment. See
IFC, Technical Assistance and IFC Advisory Services, available at
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/services/ta/ta.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
The IFC’s Risk Management Program was launched in 1990. It intends to facilitate the access of Third World private sector entities to the derivative markets to reduce their currency risks. IFC, Risk Management Products and Services, available at http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/risk/risk
.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
150. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, Apr. 12, 1988, 1508 U.N.T.S. 181, 199, 24 I.L.M. 1605 [hereinafter
MIGA Convention]. For a study of the MIGA Convention see generally, Jean
Touscoz, Les Opérations de Garantie de L’Agence Multilaterale des Investissements (AMGI), 114 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 901 (1987). The drafting of the MIGA Convention was parallel to the drafting of a set of guidelines
for the treatment of investors directed at the states signatories of the MIGA
Convention. These guidelines have the form of recommendation to the states
members of the World Bank Group. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. S HIHATA,
LEGAL T REATMENT OF F OREIGN INVESTMENT : T HE WORLD BANK G UIDELINES
(1993).
151. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 1.
152. Art. 23 of the MIGA Convention states: “The Agency shall carry out
research, undertake activities to promote investment flows and disseminate
information on investment opportunities in developing member countries with
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At the time of its creation, the MIGA was designed not only to
create a multilateral system of investment guarantees, but also
to restore a climate of confidence after the instable period following decolonization.153 The MIGA provides private investors
insurance against the following risks: war and civil disturbance,
breach of contract, currency inconvertibility, and expropriation.154 When the MIGA grants an insurance contract for an
investment in a signatory country, the country must grant its
approval to the issuance of it guarantee by the MIGA.155 Once
the MIGA pays compensation to a holder of a guarantee, it subrogates to the rights or claims that the holder of a guarantee
had against the host country and other obligors.156 The MIGA
also offers a range of advisory services, for which it charges
market rates.157
The IFC requires that the projects it supports meet a number
of guidelines. This means that the project must be technically
and environmentally sound, beneficial to the local economy, and
potentially profitable.158 Relatively recently, the IFC has
adopted its own policies tailored to the private sector in a broad
number of areas.159 Prior to adopting its own policies, the IFC
a view to improving the environment for foreign investment flows in such
countries.” MIGA Convention, supra note 150, art. 11.
153. Touscoz, supra note 150, at 901–902.
154. MIGA Convention, supra note 150, art. 11.
155. Id. art. 15.
156. Id. art. 18(a).
157. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 4.
158. IFC, Operational Policy 4.01: Environmental Assessment § 1 (Oct.
1998) [hereinafter IFC OP]. A similar language is used by MIGA, whose asserted policy is that all the investments it facilitates are carried out in an
environmentally and socially responsible manner. See MIGA, Environmental
and
Social
Review
Procedures,
Introduction,
available
at
http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose/soc_rev.htm (last visited, Jan.
25, 2002).
159. The IFC has adopted its own policies in the following areas: Environmental Assessment, IFC OP 4.01 (Oct. 1998); Natural Habitats, IFC OP 4.04
(Nov. 1998); Pest Management, IFC OP 4.09 (Nov. 1998); Forestry, IFC OP
4.36 (Nov. 1998); Safety of Dams, IFC OP 4.37 (Sept. 1996); International
Waterways, IFC OP 7.50 (Nov. 1998); Indigenous Peoples, IFC OD 4.20 (Sept.
1991); Involuntary Resettlement, IFC OD 4.30 (June 1990); Cultural Property, World Bank Operational Policy Note 11.03 (Sept. 1986); Child and
Forced Labor, Policy Statement (March 1998). See IFC, ENVIRONMENT:
S AFEGUARD POLICIES (2000), at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/Safeguard/
safeguard.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
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referred to the IBRD’s, without providing any further detail. In
fact, an oil investment failure in Guatemala prompted the IFC
to adopt its own policies.160
The IFC granted two loans to the U.S. oil company Basic Resources International Ltd. (“BASIC”) to support the construction of an oil pipeline and to allow for expansion of the comp anies’ activities in the Maya Biosphere Rain Forest in 1994 and
1996 respectively.161 The construction of the oil pipeline was to
take place in La Laguna del Tigre National Park, recognized as
a wetland of international importance by the Ramsar Conve ntion on Wetlands of 1971, ratified by Guatemala in 1990.162 The
first lending package was approved in 1995.163 NGOs claimed
that the environmental assessment was insufficient because
even if the IFC categorized the Project as Category A, the
proper consultation and public participation did not take
place.164 The US-based NGO Conservation International (“CI”)
met with the IFC twice during 1994–95 to recommend changes
in the pipeline route and to promote the creation and implementation of an environmental mitigation plan.165 The IFC,
160. Another project that prompted this need for specific policies was the
Pangue Hydroelectric Project in Chile. See Bretton Woods Project, Bretton
Woods Update No. 9 — Apr. 1998, at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/update/09/09b.html (last visited, Jan. 25, 2002).
161. FRANCESCO M ARTONE , OIL D RILLING IN THE GUATEMALAN RAINFOREST: A
S KELETON IN THE IFC’S CLOSET (Campagna per la Riforma della Banca
Mondiale, Sept. 2000), available at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifccaseguatemala.
html.
162. Id. Although, by law oil development is prohibited within the core
zones of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, BASIC’s operations were “grandfathered” into the national park because the concession was granted in 1985,
five years before the reserve and park were created in 1990. The company’s
concession was granted in 1985, five years before the creation of the reserve
and the park. BASIC’s 1985 concession covered about 3% of the current area
of La Laguna del Tigre National Park. However, in 1992, two years after the
establishment of La Laguna del Tigre as a national park and a core zone
within the Maya Biosphere Reserve, BASIC was granted a second concession
that expanded the concession area to cover more than 60% of the park. See
IAN A. BOWLES ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CORPORATION LENDING AND P ROPOSALS FOR REFORM : A CASE S TUDY
OF C ONSERVATION AND OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE G UATEMALAN PETEN, available
at http://www.law.ufl.edu/cgr/publications/environmental_impacts.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2002).
163. M ARTONE , supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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however, replied that no route changes were possible and that
the environmental assessment sufficiently addressed environmental mitigation measures.166
A second IFC loan was approved in 1996.167 The consultation
process had improved, but local communities were still not involved in the discussion and formulation of the environmental
assessment and environmental management plan required for
Category A projects. Public access to documents was not guaranteed, and the only available copies were in English at
BASIC’s headquarters in Guatemala City.168 Nevertheless,
some NGOs obtained the Project documents and formulated a
series of recommendations.169 The NGOs claimed that the Project violated certain World Bank policies, especially the Natural
Habitats Operational Policy, which obliges the Bank to fund
projects only when “comprehensive analysis demonstrates that
overall benefits from the project substantially outweigh the environmental costs.”170 An improved environmental management plan was produced, but BASIC had already started construction activities before the IFC Board had approved the loan
in July 1996.171 Whatever the merits of the NGOs’ allegations
were, this and other similar projects showed that the consultation and public disclosure record among IFC projects was weak.
The IFC’s own policies cover the following areas: environmental assessment, natural habitats, pest management, forestry, projects on international waterways, and the safeguarding of cultural property.172 In areas where the IFC has not yet
adopted its own policy, such as indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement, it applies the relevant IBRD policy.173 A
similar framework is applied to MIGA, which adopted its own

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. A new World Bank Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on
Natural Habitats was adopted by the World Bank in June 2001. The new
World Bank OP 4.04: Natural Habitats, ¶ 5, maintains the same requirement.
171. M ARTONE , supra note 161, at 3.
172. See sources cited supra note 162. See also IFC Environmental & Social
Review, supra note 38, ¶ 6, Table 1.
173. See IFC Environmental & Social Review, supra note 38.
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Environmental Assessment Policy in 1999.174 The MIGA also
incorporates by reference IFC policies, “where applicable.”175
Finally, the MIGA applies the World Bank Environmental
Guidelines to all projects.176
Both IFC and MIGA have recently adopted relatively specific
policies on child labor. According to its policy statement, IFC
will not support projects that use forced labor or child labor.177
The MIGA applies a similar policy.178 However, no specific policy exists relating to other labor standards, although the IFC’s
Policy Statement affirms that “[p]rojects should comply with
the national laws of the host countries, including those that
protect core labor standards and related treaties ratified by the
host countries.”179 The Policy Statement fails to define core labor standards. It is questionable whether a general reference to
“national laws of the host countries” represents eno ugh protection against labor abuse in the projects, especially in countries
that do not guarantee basic freedoms such as freedom of association. Although non-compliance with local laws and regulations now allows the IFC to call in a loan, it is doubtful whether
respect for workers’ basic rights has really been mainstreamed
as an essential aspect of the agencies’ operations.180 As a matter of fact, when IFC management certifies that the project is in
accordance with the Operational Policies during the project cycle, it does not certify the project’s performance against host

174. MIGA, Environmental Assessment Policy (Annex B to MIGA’s Operational
Regulations),
Environment
and
Disclosure
Policies,
at
http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose/environ.htm (last visited, Jan.
25, 2002) [hereinafter MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy].
175. See MIGA Environmental & Social Review, supra note 38, ¶ 14.
176. Id. ¶ 11.
177. IFC, POLICY S TATEMENT ON FORCED L ABOR AND HARMFUL CHILD L ABOR
(Mar. 1998), available at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/enviro/childlabor/Child_
and_Forced_Labor.pdf [hereinafter F ORCED L ABOR POLICY S TATEMENT].
178. In 1998, new provisions were introduced in MIGA’s contract of guarantee requiring guarantee holders to refrain from employing harmful child labour and or forced labour. These amendments also entitle MIGA to terminate
a contract if the investment project does not meet these labour standards,
although the client can bring them into compliance if MIGA determines that
the situation can be corrected. Ikawa, supra note 135, at 26.
179. FORCED LABOR POLICY S TATEMENT, supra note 177.
180. Id. The usual practice is to give the client some time to put itself in
compliance and then call the loan. A similar mechanism is applied by MIGA.
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country labor requirements.181 Thus, it would be necessary to
adopt an operational policy requiring compliance at least with
the core labor standards enshrined in the 1998 International
Labour Organisation (“ILO”) Declaration.182 This operational
policy should also include social protections in project assessments and especially in project monitoring.183
Both private sector branches of the World Bank share the
same dispute settlement mechanism, the Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman (“CAO”), which is less well known than its World
Bank counterpart — the Inspection Panel.184 The CAO post was
created in 1999 to enhance the overall performance and accountability of the IFC and MIGA in the social and environmental areas.185 Its creation resulted from a broad consultation
between the IFC, MIGA, NGOs, members of the business community, and populations affected by IFC projects in the past.186
The main NGOs advocated for the extension of the World Bank
Inspection Panel to the private arm branches of the Bank.187 It
has been argued that the IFC resisted submitting to the World
Bank Inspection Panel, in spite of the pressure by some shareholders and that the CAO was created as a sort of compromise
181. IFC Environmental & Social Review, supra note 38. This is also the
case in MIGA’s clearance procedure. MIGA Environmental & Social Review,
supra note 38.
182. International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Gen. Conf. Res., 86th Sess. (June 19, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
183. Id. These principles are: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Id.
art. 2.
184. For a study of the World Bank Inspection Panel, see Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the
World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 V A. J. INT ’L L. 553 (1994); ALVARO UMAÑA
QUESADA , T HE INSPECTION P ANEL’S EXPERIENCE (1998). But see James Thuo
Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF . HUM . RTS. L.
REV . 107, 166 (1999). For Gatthii, the Inspection Panel “is simply another one
of the Bank’s strategies of opening itself up to scrutiny on its own terms
within its predefined projects and programs and on its own turf.” Id. at 166.
The Panel, thus, gives the Bank the possibility of acting like a judge in its own
cause.
185. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 5.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
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alternative.188 The CAO has been working for only a short time
so it is still very early to assess its effect. Even if the CAO is
not able to provide a judicial-type review of policy compliance, it
can provide useful ways of addressing certain shortcomings in
IFC/MIGA projects. In some cases, as will be argued below, the
CAO may be more effective than the World Bank Inspection
Panel, because it is less dependent on the Board of Directors.
The CAO has three roles: (a) to respond to the complaints by
persons who are affected by projects and attempt to resolve the
issues raised (the ombudsman role); (b) to provide independent
advice to the President and senior management of IFC and
MIGA (the advisor role); and (c) to oversee audits of IFC and
MIGA social and environmental performance (the compliance
role).189 The three roles may overlap. For example, the CAO
may initiate a compliance audit on its own initiative following a
complaint.190
Three characteristics describe the CAO’s role: independence
from management, flexibility in its approach to problems, and a
lack of “hard” authority to impose the solutions proposed.191
The very open grounds for lodging a complaint demo nstrate the
CAO’s flexibility.
Complainants may refer to the noncompliance of particular guidelines or address policy issues.192
In this respect, it is easier to address a complaint to the CAO
than to the World Bank Inspection Panel, because a complaint
to the latter must refer to a particular policy that has been violated. Moreover, only the violation of the Bank’s Operational
188. Id.
189. IFC, O PERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE OFFICE OF THE IFC/MIGA
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR /OMBUDSMAN , § 1.1.2 (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.ifc.org/cao/english/guidelines/ENGLISH_09-20-00_pdf [hereinafter
CAO GUIDELINES]. On the audit role, guidelines have been developed by CAO.
See CAO, CAO COMPLIANCE AUDIT ROLE : GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE AUDITING
AND ENHANCING O UTCOMES (June 2002), at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org.
190. Id. § 5.1.2. An important part of the advisory role is commenting on the
existing policies and their application in practice. A human rights sensitive
CAO may have a very important impact in this field.
191. Id. § 1.3.2. The CAO recruits her own staff, is not part of IFC management, and reports directly to the President of the World Bank. The idea is
to gain the trust of people affected by projects.
192. Id. § 2.4.1. The same “flexible” approach is taken with regard to compliance audits. The very section acknowledges that the operational guidelines
are susceptible to different interpretations and that audits do not aim at establishing a different authoritative interpretation. Id. § 5.1.4.
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Policies and Procedures, (as opposed to the violation of the
Bank Good Practices), may render an Inspection Panel complaint acceptable.193 The CAO may choose the means of solving
a complaint. For example, it may decide not to deal with the
complaint under the ombudsman role, and instead provide advice to IFC and MIGA.194 Once the CAO has decided to act as
an ombudsman, it has discretion as to which method should be
used to address the issue: sometimes the solution would be a
fact-finding mission, sometimes a “problem solving” approach
through conciliation or mediation.195 For investigation purposes, a proactive CAO may be more effective than the World
Bank Inspection Panel, because the Executive Directors can
stop a Panel proposal for an investigation whereas the CAO
independently decides on the measures to take.196
Therefore, the main focus of this Ombudsman capacity is to
foster communication between local communities and project
sponsors, and to help find solutions that are acceptable to both
parties.197 The solutions can eventually take a written form.198
This is important because a final written compromise may then
give rise to contractual obligations enforceable in local courts or
arbitration. Nevertheless, the conciliating role, (as opposed to
adjudicating), makes the effectiveness of the Ombudsman
highly dependent on the mediators’ personal skills and experience, as well as on the magnitude of the problems. The Guidelines state that the Ombudsman will focus “on what is going to
happen in the future, rather than on what happened in the
past.”199 Therefore, one may imagine the Ombudsman being
effective when parties are discussing compensation prices and
measures, but not where the human rights situation of the local
populations has drastically deteriorated. An example would be
193. IBRD/IDA Resolution, supra note 36, ¶ 12.
194. CAO GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at § 3.3.4.
195. Id. §§ 3.3.5, 4.
196. Compare IBRD/IDA Resolution, supra note 36, ¶ VI, with CAO
GUIDELINES, supra note 189, § 3. In fact, a request was denied by the Board of
Executive Directors in the Itapartica Resettlement and Irrigation Project in
Brazil, a case where an investigation was recommended by the Inspection
Panel. S IGRUN I. S KOGLY, F ROM HUMAN CAPITAL TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS O BLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE I.M.F. 185 (2001).
197. CAO GUIDELINES, supra note 189, § 4.1.2.
198. Id. § 4.1.5.
199. Id. § 2.1.1.
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a case in which the security forces have been called by the oil
companies and exercised massive repression in the project area.
In addition, the lack of specific authority makes the leverage of
the CAO dependent on the amount of loan money that has already been disbursed. As the CAO has acknowledged, “where
the monies are drawn down, the leverage will be less.”200
It is important to determine whether the human rights discourse is able to improve the content and effectiveness of these
mechanisms. For a number of years, the human rights obligations of international financial institutions have been the subject of an abundant literature.201 Commentators have stressed
that the World Bank, as an international organization, is the
subject of international law and, as such, is bound by general
rules of international law.202 The problem is how to determine
the exact content of these obligations. Sigrun Skogly’s notion of
200. Id. at Introduction.
201. Commentators have dealt with the different dimensions of these obligations. There is an “internal” human rights dimension, i.e., the integration
of human rights considerations into its own policies. The “external” aspect of
it, i.e. the imposition of human rights conditionalities upon the Bank’s clients
has also been the subject of a wide debate. See Victoria E. Marmorstein,
World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 113 (1978); Sigrun I. Skogly, Structural Adjustment and Development: Human Rights — An Agenda for Change, 15 HUM . RTS. Q. 751
(1993); Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems, 17 HUM . RTS. Q. 411 (1995); John D. Ciorciari, The Lawful
Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit Decisions: An Interpretative Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, 33 CORNELL INT ’L
L.J. 331 (2000).
202. This argument is based on the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation
of the Agreement between the WHO and Egypt of 25 March 1951, 1980 I.C.J.
73, 89–90. See also Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the I.M.F. and Human Rights, 6 T RANSNAT ’L L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS . 47 (1996). Bradlow
stresses the fact that IFIs cannot violate customary international law. Id. at
63. During the 1960s South African loans controversy, Constantin A. Stavropoulos, the U.N. Legal Counsel responded to the Bank’s argumentation that
human rights were not a political affair but a source of legal obligations under
the U.N. Charter. See Statement of the U.N. Legal Counsel to the U.N.
Fourth Committee, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 150, 171–73 (1967). Schermers and
Blokker argue that international organizations, even in the absence of consent, are bound by international law because their subordination to it is
clearer than that of states. HENRY G. S CHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITH DIVERSITY 988 (1995). On
responsibility of international organizations, see generally PIERRE K LEIN, L A
RESPONSABILITE DES O RGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES D ANS LES ORDRE S
JURIDIQUES INTERNES ET EN DROIT DES GENS (1998).
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self-policing provides a good approach.203 Under Skogly’s approach, the principal obligation of the IFIs would be to insert
human rights considerations into their own projects in order to
ensure that human rights are not violated.204 Along the continuum of respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights,
Skogly emphasizes that the World Bank has the obligation to
respect such rights, deriving from customary law and general
rules of international law. However, Skogly believes it would
not be plausible to argue that the World Bank has the obligation to promote and fulfill human rights, as these obligations
derive from treaties to which it is not a party.205 The concept of
respect involves both a negative obligation to ensure that the
human rights situation does not deteriorate as a consequence of
the project, as well as a more positive obligation to observe human rights as they are currently implemented.206 By the same
token, the insertion of human rights considerations into World
Bank contracts may be seen as part of its obligation to respect
human rights.
Moreover, it can be argued that mainstreaming human rights
considerations into project finance should be part of the World
Bank agencies’ duties to promote sustainable development.
This argument is consistent with the content of the Bank’s policies and with the fact that the concept of sustainable development is evolving into a general principle of international law.207
Increasingly, the notion of sustainable development is seen to

203. See S KOGLY, supra note 196, at 151–52.
204. Id. See also U.N. World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 157/24 pt. 1 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661. The Program directed the WB and other international institutions to assess the social impacts of the projects that they finance.
205. S KOGLY, supra note 196, at 151.
206. Id.
207. McGoldrick argues that the principle of sustainable development has
made some progress to the status of a legal principle. Dominic McGoldrick,
Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 796, 802 (1996). Other commentators argue that it has yet
to become a norm of international law. For an example of the soft law developments in the area, see Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and
the Programme of Action of World Summit for Social Development, at Commitment 2 § (h), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) (encouraging MDBs to support people-centered development).
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encompass not only respect for the environment but also respect
for human rights and community or popular participation.208
With respect to asserting human rights obligations upon the
World Bank, the difficult question lies in the determination of
the content of the obligations, rather than the legal justifications. Would the adoption of a human rights approach be
merely an intellectual exercise or would it represent any actual
improvement in the quality of oil projects? Since the late 1980s,
the Bank has adopted some human rights concepts, such as
participation, without using human rights terminology.209 The
Bank’s current approach to programming is not enough, however, because even if the Bank claims that the furtherance of
economic and social rights is its raison d’être, its project preparation is not in fact based on a human rights approach.210
As Skogly points out, the duty to respect imposes both substantial and procedural obligations.211 Substantive obligations
in the context of project lending may include an evaluation of
the human rights impacts on the populations concerned, an
identification of specific human rights, a study of each individual right to determine which problems are likely to arise, and
an amendment of policies in order to avoid a deteriorated human rights effect.212 Procedural obligations would consist of
incorporating human rights considerations into different phases
of a project: identification, preparation, appraisal, loan negotiation, implementation, and evaluation.213 In fact, the adoption of
a human rights approach would refine the substantive content
of existing operational standards. Procedures would also be
modified so as to reduce management discretion in the decisionmaking process.
208. McGoldrick, supra note 207, at 800. The U.N. SG Agenda incorporates
a vision of development as an integrated approach through five dimensions:
peace as the foundation, economy as the engine of growth, environment as the
basis of sustainability, justice as a pillar of society and democracy as good
governance.
209. Patricia Armstrong, Human Rights and Non-State Actors, 11 PACE
INT’L L. REV . 205, 239 (1999).
210. Id. at 243.
211. S KOGLY, supra note 196, at 151.
212. Id. at 152.
213. Id. at 162. See also Katarina Tomasevski, Human Rights Impact Assessment: Proposals for the Next 50 Years of Bretton Woods, in P ROMOTING
DEVELOPMENT: EFFECTIVE GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 82, 94 (Jo Marie Griesgrabber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1995).
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As noted above, the operational standards do not provide
comprehensive treatment of human rights issues. A human
rights approach would imply a change in the rationale of certain OD and OP provisions. The World Bank does not currently
treat human rights law the same way as it treats commercial
law.214 As the following discussion will show, a modification of
the “instrumental versus human rights approach” should correct the numerous insufficiencies existing within the procedural
guarantees.
Some of the human rights problems concern all of the IBRD,
IFC, and MIGA policies, while others are specific to the private
sector character of the IFC and MIGA. It seems that, even in
the event that the procedures are thoroughly respected, loopholes exist, which permit broad managerial discretion. Many of
the OPs refer to vague terms, such as “where appropriate.”215
The World Bank endeavors not to finance projects that would
cause severe environmental or natural resource deterioration,
displace people, or unduly compromise public health and safety,
without taking mitigating measures “acceptable to the Bank.”216
This is the case of project classification for the environmental
assessment purposes. Even though the OP on Environmental
Assessment establishes criteria for project classification, the
final decision is left to management, which makes case-by-case
determinations.217 This fact is significant because it may affect
the human rights of the populations concerned. As the more
stringent consultation obligations depend on relatively discretionary managerial decisions, the consultation process may be
significantly reduced. If the project is financed by the IBRD, no
formal violation of the Bank’s Policies and Procedures would be
found, and therefore it would not be possible to trigger the jurisdiction of the Inspection Panel. If it is an IFC or MIGA loan
project, the CAO may still accept the complaint, even without a
formal violation, because the CAO Guidelines do not require a
policy violation to have occurred for a complaint to be accepted;
instead, it requires a much weaker basis.
214. Armstrong, supra note 209, at 246.
215. See, e.g., OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9, 12; OP 4.12:
Involuntary Resettlement, ¶¶ 14, 18, 24.
216. KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND H UMAN RIGHTS
REVISITED 67–68 (1993).
217. IFC Project Categorization Examples, supra note 51.
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Moreover, different World Bank institutions link different
consultation requirements to each project category, which detracts from clarity and legal certainty. Category B projects, for
example, have certain consultation requirements in IBRD and
IDA loans.218 In IFC loans, however, consultation in Category B
projects takes place “as appropriate.”219 The MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy does not even require consultation
for Category B projects.220 Therefore, mistakes committed in
the early phases of a project may affect the final outcome. In
this respect, it is necessary to increase the role of monitoring
bodies, such as the Inspection Panel or the CAO, to guarantee
that stakeholders are properly involved and that environmental
impacts are taken into account.
With respect to human rights protection, more troubl esome is
the process through which the World Bank is transforming its
early instruments, the ODs, into more modern standards: Operational Policies, Bank Procedures, and Good Practices. The
transformation process is carried out as follows: the World
Bank’s management prepares a draft and opens it to the civil
society for comments;221 the Bank’s staff exercises discretion in
deciding what comments it keeps or rejects;222 the final version
is then circulated to the Board of Directors for approval.223
Although this transformation may have the merit of increasing clarity as to what is mandatory and what is not, the excessive discretion of the Bank staff poses a number of risks. First,
as Benedict Kingsbury observes, the empowerment of the Inspection Panel to examine projects by reference to the Bank’s
Operational Policies and Procedures, but not to assess the adequacy of those policies themselves, appears to provide some incentives to the management to try to attenuate the policies.224
The drafters may, for example, put some of the former Operational Directive contents into Good Practices, which would then
218. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment ¶¶ 15, 18.
219. IFC OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment ¶¶ 12, 14.
220. MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy, supra note 174, ¶¶ 9–12.
221. The World Bank, Policies, Policy Formulation and Review, at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,content/M
DK:20040574~menuPK:34574~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600,00.html#formulati
on (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 331.

File: Uriz Base Macro final.doc

2002]

Created on: 11/2/2002 6:56 PM

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

THE WORLD BANK & THE OIL INDUSTRY

113

become merely hortatory. As a consequence, provisions guaranteeing respect for human rights would not be binding, and
would therefore be placed out the Inspection Panel’s jurisdiction.
Second, the substantive content of environmental and social
protections may also be watered down. The wording of the former version of the Involuntary Resettlement Operational Directive seemed to indicate that the guarantees to be given to resettling populations were a cost to the projects rather than a fundamental right. Mentioning community involvement, it declared “initial resistance to the idea of involuntary displacement
is to be expected”225 and addressed consultation as a necessary
problem rather than a fundamental right, it stated: “[t]o obtain
co-operation, participation and feedback, the affected hosts and
settlers need to be systematically informed and consulted during preparation of the resettlement plan about their options and
rights.”226 Although the current version uses a more politically
correct language, it has substantially reduced the protections
granted to project stakeholders, as the following examples demonstrate.
Whereas the former OD contained a presumption in favor of
the recognition of rights to land even without formal legal title,
(for example, customary rights), the current draft version only
recognizes these rights if the local legislation acknowledges a
claim to such rights.227 The current OP has also eliminated
some of the strongest references to community involvement. As
another example, the former OD required plans to include a
strategy for community participation,228 which was described as
“critical.”229 It also established a presumption in favor of local
NGO involvement, given their ability to foster participation.230
225. World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 8. This is the former
version of World Bank OP 4.12.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 15(a)–(b). Section
3(e) of the former World Bank OD included amongst the potential compensation recipients “[I]ndigenous groups, ethnic minorities, and pastoralists who
may have usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken
for the project. The absence of legal title to land by such groups should not be
a bar to compensation.” World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 8.
228. World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement § 5.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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It further stated that there should be certain institutionalized
arrangements, such as regular meetings between officials and
communities.231 The current version of OD, however, talks
vaguely about participatory processes, which must be acceptable to the Bank.232 The current version also deals with supervision and monitoring in less detail than in the past, giving
Bank officials wider discretion in both procedural and substantive issues.233
As the World Bank standards are in some cases the only protections available to people affected by a project, this “wateringdown” of language may have serious consequences. This risk
could be avoided through a greater “judicialization” of the panel
— by expanding its jurisdiction to include assessment of the
substantive quality of the standards. International human
rights norms in the area that the relevant Guideline purports to
safeguard should be the benchmarks against which the “constitutionality” of the standards is assessed.
The IFC and MIGA operational standards do not cover all the
human rights issues likely to affect oil companies. For example,
as reported by international human rights NGOs, violent security forces employed by oil companies are a major source of human rights violations.234 This may be a practical problem in the
IFC-financed oil exploitations. Recently, the IFC has granted a
loan to Harken de Colombia Ltd., a subsidiary of the Texas231. Id.
232. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 7.
233. The former World Bank OD provided for supervision during implementation through Bank missions and annual reviews of large-scale resettlement.
In-depth Bank reviews of midterm progress are also “highly desirable.” World
Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 31. Finally, the project completion
report submitted to the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) should
evaluate resettlement and its impact on the standards of living of the resettlers and the host population. Id. ¶ 32.
234. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, S UDAN: T HE HUMAN P RICE OF OIL ch.
3 (Human Rights Violations Committed in the Name of Oil, 2000); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, T HE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND H UMAN
RIGHTS V IOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES, ch. 5 (The Environment) (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria
/index.htm; Letter from José Miguél Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas
Division, Human Rights Watch to E. John Browne, Group Chief Executive,
British
Petroleum
Company
Plc.
(Apr.
17,
1998),
at
http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/corporations/colombia/Oilpat-01.htm [hereinafter Vivanco Letter].
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based Harken Energy Corp., to develop four oil fields in Colombia for export.235 Prior to this granting, serious human rights
violations issues arose in Columbia regarding the effect of private security forces on oil exploration.236 Therefore, an IFCfinanced investment may need to address this question at some
point. However, how to make project sponsors abide by their
own policies within the security area is still an issue for further
study. The development of voluntary auditing practices by the
primary oil companies may be a promising first step. If auditing and reporting become standard practice in the industry,
there would be some grounds upon which to incorporate representations and warranties into project finance. In the financial
field, it is customary to include representations of the type: “the
annual accounts, as audited, reflect accurately the situation of
the company.” If human rights considerations, including private security, become a subject of public relations for corporations, it would be easier to create contractual conditions necessary to instil human rights protections.
Some other problems linked to business development may
also have an impact on human rights. In certain projects, the
IFC and the MIGA are minority shareholders and have less leverage than they otherwise might have.237 On many occasions,
the two agencies are called to finance projects that have already
started. In such situations, the agencies must verify that the
environmental and social assessments undertaken by the project sponsors conform to IFC/MIGA policies.238 In addition, the
reinforcement of independent monitoring bodies is critical, in
order to guarantee that the review be genuine rather than a
mere formality.

235. Press Release, IFC, IFC Finances Development of Oilfields in Colombia
(Sept. 1, 1999), at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ifcext/pressroom/
ifcpressroom.nsf.
236. British Petroleum became the target of NGO criticism when it was
accused of employing paramilitary forces to protect its investment in Colombia. See Amnesty International, Colombia: British Petroleum Risks Fuelling
Human Rights Crisis through Military Training, (June 30, 1997), at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/AMR23044199/?OpenDocument. See also
Vivanco Letter, supra note 234.
237. CAO Guidelines, supra note 189 (Introduction).
238. IFC OP 4.01, supra note 158, at ¶ 13. IFC Safeguard Policies, supra
note 37.
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Prepayment of loans by project sponsors is another business
issue that has arisen in practice. In that event, the IFC or the
MIGA exit from the project, thereby releasing the borrower
from its environmental and social commitments. For example,
this happened with the lending package granted by the IFC to
the U.S. company BASIC for oil extraction in Guatemala.239 In
cases where the loans are prepaid, it would be necessary to include contractual clauses requiring borrowers to report even
after loan repayment, and to include guarantees (for example,
penalty payments) to ensure their continuing compliance with
environmental and social standards.
Finally, although the IFC and MIGA policies can be reinforced, some greater issues may prevent these institutions from
adopting a serious monitoring role. First, there may be a contradiction between their roles as investors and development
agencies. As Bergesen and Lunde point out, the World Bank
raises its money in the capital markets, where the dominant
criteria for lending is a project’s rate of return, calculated by
conventional financial input/output analysis.240 Despite this,
the World Bank institutions’ roles as development agencies and
their anti-poverty strategies require a priority for the poorest
countries and populations.241
Secondly, conflicts of interests may also exist, between the
IFC’s role as a profit-making investor and that of an adviser,
especially where some IFC departments have merged with
those in the World Bank. As a result, the same group of people
may be advising governments on privatization and deregulation
strategies,242 while discussing private sector investment plans
and taking stakes in the same sector.
239. BASIC prepaid its loan in 1999. M ARTONE , supra note 161, at 1.
240. The Bank attained its prestige on Wall Street by being a very conservative lender (it concentrated its loans especially in infrastructure), and thus
gained the AAA status that permitted it to borrow at the best possible conditions. BERGESEN AND LUNDE , supra note 2, at 109.
241. The Bank’s lending in the social sector never exceeded 6%, although
the Bank itself acknowledged that the long-term rate of return of social investment is high. Tomasevski, supra note 216. While IFC has operations in
129 countries, it has been criticised for concentrating a large part of its activities in countries that can attract other private sector lenders by themselves,
such as Brazil and Russia. See IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT, supra note 134, at 1.
242. The IBRD and the IFC operate jointly the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service (“FIAS”). The FIAS helps developing and transition countries design
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Third, there is another potential contradiction — which was
very visible in the Chad/Cameroon Project — between the
World Bank’s watchdog responsibilities and its lending role. On
some occasions, an unyielding application of the standards may
lead to the abandonment of a commercial operation, yet, as an
active lender, the World Bank Group must finance projects for
its very institutional survival. A good example of this contradiction would be the involvement of the IFC in a lending project
to develop an oilfield affecting an indigenous community. The
indigenous community, apart from not being an oil consumer,
would not be keen on modifying its traditional modus vivendi.
As an investor, the IFC would be interested in a quick and effective project cycle, and, as a lender, would also wish to further
its clients’ interests. However, the IFC has acknowledged that
its clients are unhappy with its bureaucracy and slow project
approval process.243 This illustrates that the enlargement of the
World Bank’s role as a standard setter must be accompanied by
the development of independent monitoring mechanisms with
mandatory, (as opposed to merely hortatory), powers that actually guarantee a reliable application of those standards.
V. CONCLUSION
Discussion of human rights is occupying many new fields.
From the NGO forum, to scholarly writings, and international
organizations, human rights have now jumped to boards of directors and stock exchange quotations. These developments
prove that the human rights discourse is being mainstreamed
into new areas. Earlier, human rights were the province of philosophy and the law, prominent in political theory, and in constitutional jurisprudence. Following the Second World War,
human rights have become a matter of international law and
international relations.244 Now, they also seem to be entering
initiatives to attract foreign direct investment.
See FIAS, at
http://www.fias.net (last visited, Jan. 25, 2002).
243. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 6. Nevertheless, the fact is
that the IFC is a transaction oriented agency, whereas the Bank is more strategic and policy oriented. Whereas the average project cycle is only five to
seven months at the IFC, it is eighteen to twenty-four months at the Bank.
See M ICHELLE M ILLER-ADAMS, THE WORLD B ANK : NEW AGENDAS IN A C HANGING
WORLD 59, 112 (1999).
244. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13 (1990).

File: Uriz Base Macro final.doc

118

Created on: 11/2/2002 6:56 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

[Vol. 28:1

the province of business. Paraphrasing Louis Henkin, corporations “today do not feel free to preach what they may persist in
practicing.”245
Over the decades, the World Bank has extended its field of
activities from mere project finance to cover economic and institutional reforms.246 As a result of this mission creep, the World
Bank is now undergoing an identity crisis, because it is obliged
to face conflicting goals.247 The clarification and systematization of these issues is outside the scope of this Article. However, the need to address an overall reform of international financial institutions is not an obstacle to the reinforcement and
rule-based application of their own operational policies through
the execution of the World Bank’s investments.
The World Bank’s operational standards, even if they do not
use a human rights language, introduce basic human rights
protections, such as consultation with affected populations. In
some cases, the application of these “soft law” rules may be the
only guarantee for affected populations. The World Bank may
also act as a trendsetter, with regard to both public and private
entities. These entities might eventually endorse, rather than
reject, the operational standards, and might even apply them to
projects not involving the Bank.248 Moreover, the World Bank
has developed non-judicial procedures that may, on some occasions, be the only discussion forum provided to the affected
populations. In this respect, the World Bank’s policies could
potentially become an incipient international administrative
law, which would establish uniform benchmarks of protection in
the development of natural resources.249 Given the confusion

245. Id. at x. According to Professor Henkin, “governments today do not feel
free to preach what they may persist in practicing.” Id. at x (emphasis added).
246. John Toye, Structural Adjustment: Context, Assumptions, Origin and
Diversity, in S TRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND BEYOND IN S UB-S AHARAN AFRICA:
RESEARCH AND POLICY ISSUES 19, 29 (Rolph van der Hoeven & Fred van der
Kraaij eds., 1994). See generally M ILLER-ADAMS, supra note 243, at 73, 112;
Cahn, supra note 18; D ASGUPTA , supra note 18.
247. For a recent analysis of the Bank’s dilemmas, see Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines, The World Bank: An Overview of Some Major Issues, in
THE WORLD BANK: S TRUCTURES AND P OLICIES 10–32 (C. Gilbert & D. Vines
eds., 2000).
248. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 339.
249. Id. at 323.
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currently reigning in the petroleum sector, a trendsetter is indeed necessary.
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ADDENDUM

While this article was being prepared for publication, the
World Bank Inspection Panel issued its Investigation Report on
the Chad Cameroon Project.250 Although the Panel praises the
Bank’s efforts to apply its policies in a challenging environment
and to build a strong external monitoring capacity,251 it also
finds that the Project is in breach with a number of World Bank
Operational Policies to the extent that the Project could jeopardize its ultimate poverty reduction objective. The Panel first
points out several breaches of World Bank OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) with respect to the definition of the region
area and the assessment of the Project’s environmental effects
at the regional level. The Report further identifies a series of
the Project’s deficiencies with the capacity building and economic management.252 The Panel observes that due to the Project’s lack of a more thorough appraisal of its sustainability and
risks, the Project fails to comply with World Bank OP 10.04
(Economic Evaluation on Investment Operations). The Panel
expresses its worry over the fact that while the oil field and
pipeline construction are operating ahead of schedule, the capacity building measures are falling behind.253
Although the World Bank does not have specific operational
policies on good governance and human rights, the group of
people who filed the request for inspection at the Panel argued
that the Project violated the Bank’s policies in this respect.254
250. See Press Release, World Bank Board of Directors Approves Management’s Response to Inspection Panel Report on Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project (Sept. 12, 2002), at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/news/index.htm.
For the full text of the Report, see Chad Inspection Panel Investigation Report, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD);
Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) (Sept.
17, 2002), at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/chad_Investigation
_repor_final.pdf [hereinafter Inspection Panel Report].
251. Inspection Panel Report, supra note 250 ¶¶ 82, 308.
252. See id. ¶¶ 24–83. For a summary of the Bank’s concerns in this respect, see Executive Summary of the Inspection Panel Report.
253. See id ¶¶ 218–265, 286–293.
254. Id. ¶ 210.
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In spite of the controversial role of promoting human rights
within the Bank’s mandate, the Panel argues that it “felt
obliged to examine” whether these issues may prevent the implementation of the project in a manner compatible with the
Bank’s policies.255 After considering the troublesome human
rights panorama in Chad, the Panel affirms that “the situation
is far from ideal,” and raised questions about the Project’s compliance with the Bank’s policies.256 In the Panel’s opinion, this
problematic human rights situation will require reinforced
monitoring by the Bank.257

255. Id. ¶ 215.
256. Id. at 61 (“Box 3”), ¶¶ 216–17.
257. Id. ¶ 217.

